Impact of a salmonella outbreak investigation in a maximum security Scottish prison

N Hamlet, J Miller, H Gourlay, J Kerr and G Cunningham

N Hamlet, Locum Consultant Public Health Medicine , Forth Valley NHS Board, 33 Spittal Street, Stirling FK8 1DX

J Miller, CPHM (CDEH), Lanarkshire NHS Board, 14 Beckford Street, Hamilton ML3 0TA

H Gourlay, Healthcare Manager, Scottish Prison Service, Calton House, 5 Redheughs Rigg, Edinburgh EH12 9HW

J Kerr, Senior Nurse Advisor, Communicable Disease Control, Lanarkshire NHS Board, 14 Beckford Street, Hamilton ML3 0TA

G Cunningham, Food Safety Manager, Planning and Environment Department, North Lanarkshire Council, Council Offices, 303 Brandon Street, Motherwell

Address for correspondence: Dr Neil Hamlet, Forth Valley NHS Board, 33 Spittal Street, Stirling FK8 1DX Neil.hamlet@fvhb.scot.nhs.uk

SMJ 2006 51(3): 50

 

Abstract

Following notification of a stool sample positive for Salmonella from an inmate of a maximum security prison a concerted multidisciplinary public health response was undertaken. Lanarkshire NHS Board Health Protection Team (HPT) held one Problem Assessment Group Meeting and two Outbreak Control Team Meetings. The outbreak period spanned three weeks during which there were three confirmed and six probable cases of Salmonella enteritidis PT4 in prison inmates. The source was not identified despite thorough investigation, however the outbreak control team (OCT) was able to identify key recommendations around general hygiene, shared toilet facilities and storage of cooked food in cells. The outbreak stimulated closer working arrangements between the prison medical services and the local HPT. Co-operation during the outbreak investigation and subsequent to the OCT report facilitated both operational changes at the prison and improvements to the management of infection control across the Scottish Prison Service.

 

Background

The prison environment poses unique issues in relation to the potential for control or transmission of gastrointestinal pathogens. Her Majesty’s Prison (HMP) Shotts is a maximum security long term male adult prison catering for convicted prisoners serving sentences of four years to life. The prison has single cell accommodation with integral sanitation or access to night sanitation facilities. The prison population comprised around 530 inmates and 400 staff (150-200 per shift) at the time of the outbreak. The influx of new inmates and release of those having served their sentence is around 5-10 per week. The inmates stay in four halls (A-D), a National Induction Centre (NIC) and the Shotts Unit. Inmates only mix outwith the hall setting in the multifaith centre, library, gym, work areas and to a lesser extent when seeing visitors in the visitors’ hall. Generally staff are allocated to one area of the prison with limited cross-cover to other areas.

The reporting of diarrhoea as a symptom is common in the prison. Prisoners are routinely kept off work for a minimum of a half-day during which time they are asked to submit a stool sample. If no sample is provided, as is the case in most instances, and the prisoner appears clinically well they are returned to work that afternoon.

Lanarkshire NHS Board Health Protection Team (HPT) had never previously been called upon to investigate a gastrointestinal outbreak in HMP Shotts.

According to the Scottish Prison Service (SPS) there had been no reported gastrointestinal outbreaks in Scottish prisons in the previous five years. (Dr Alan Mitchell, Head of Heath Care, SPC; personal communication, 17/10/02)

 

Salmonella are bacteria that cause infections of the bowel. The incubation period for Salmonella is usually 12-36 hours but can range from 6-72 hours. Symptoms include nausea, vomiting, abdominal pain and fever followed by diarrhoea which usually settles in a few days.

 

Identification And Initial Investigative Actions

The index case was a young prisoner of Hall B, who had been admitted to the prison in late 2001. He developed nausea, vomiting, non-bloody diarrhoea and abdominal pain on 15th August 2002. A stool sample was reported as a ‘presumptive salmonella’ to the HPT eight days later. Other than a weekly visit from his partner and child who had previously reported similar symptoms he had no contact with the outside community. His duties in the prison were those of a ‘passman’ and included cleaning the corridor and communal toilets in Hall B. His duties did not include serving or delivering food to other prisoners. Records revealed a negative stool sample in June 2002.

 

Epidemiology

Confirmed cases were defined as those persons connected with the prison who were ill from 14/8/02 with symptoms of diarrhoea, vomiting and fever and who were reported microbiologically positive for salmonella. Probable cases were as per 'confirmed cases' but with no salmonella positive microbiology. Possible cases were not defined due to the unusual situation relating to the ‘material advantage’ of prisoners reporting diarrhoea in order to gain time off work to rest in their cells. This situation would have significantly artificially inflated ‘possible case’ numbers.  Outbreak cases were either ‘confirmed’ or ‘probable’ cases.

Enhanced surveillance/case finding:

Notices posted around the prison requested staff and prisoners to report to the Prison Health Centre with any sickness or diarrhoeal illness. Stool samples were sought from all prisoners who had recently reported to the Prison Health Centre with diarrhoeal symptoms. Attempts were made to trace a prisoner who had been released the previous day but had been unwell for three days prior to departure. Stool samples and details of illness were sought from the child of the index case. All newly self reported cases had stool samples taken promptly.

Analytical epidemiology was not considered appropriate due to the small number of cases.

 

Environmental investigations

North Lanarkshire Council (NLC) Health Protection Service undertook a comprehensive environmental assessment, including environmental sampling of all food preparation areas including main kitchen, WRVS canteen, hall food trolleys and microwaves. A full assessment was made of communal toilet and handwashing areas and the council food safety service and HMP Shotts jointly assessed the physical state of cooking facilities in Hall areas and sought evidence of hoarding of foodstuffs in prisoner's cells.

 

Microbiology

Positive isolates from clinical samples were forwarded to the Scottish Salmonella Reference Laboratory. Environmental samples taken from food preparation and delivery areas were analysed at Glasgow Scientific Services Laboratory.

 

Results

Epidemiology

A total of nine outbreak cases were identified. Three prisoners were defined as confirmed cases. Two had duties as passmen which involved cleaning communal toilets. Each was located in a different Hall. Six prisoners were classified as probable cases and were located across the four Halls and the NID.  Despite repeated interviews no clear links could be identified between the six probable cases or the three confirmed cases. The outbreak curve generated suggested ongoing spread rather than a point source [Figure 1].

 

Environmental

Food preparation and delivery:

The only point of concern raised from an initial kitchen risk assessment was the use of pooling whole eggs for the preparation of scrambled eggs. Nineteen samples taken from food preparation and delivery areas including the prison kitchen, WRVS canteen, hall serveries and hall microwaves were reported negative. 

Communal Toilet Areas Assessment:

Assessment of toilet and hand washing areas in work sheds revealed significant deficiencies in infection control practices. In the work sheds toilet areas were dirty and rubbish was lying around. Washbasins were extremely dirty, some with stagnant water and rubbish such as paper, tea-bags and tissues in the sinks.  Bar soap when available appeared mostly wet and soggy.  Electric hand dryers were available in all toilets while in others dirty and wet terry towels were in use. Some toilet bowls were found in a state of disrepair while the majority were very dirty with scum and faecal smearing seen. No toilet tissue was noted in any of the toilets since paper is issued only on request. The toilet and hand washing facilities in the other communal areas examined (education centre, visitor’s room, gym and hall C) were noted to be very good.

 

Food in cells:

Prisoners frequently stored cooked prison food in their cells for later consumption or bartering purposes. A significant amount of food was found in cells. Hygiene standards varied greatly between individual cells but in up to 50% of cells hygiene was a matter of concern.

 

Microbiological

A total of 13 samples were examined from the prison community plus the daughter of the index case over the period 21/8/02 to 10/9/02. Three positive stool samples were obtained. All three were later identified as Salmonella enterididis Phage Type 4.

The index case had a history of contact with a symptomatic daughter during weekly visits. Stool samples from the child were negative.

 

Control Measures

Care of cases

One case was admitted to the local NHS Infectious Diseases Unit for one week. Twenty-seven prisoners were placed in their cells during working hours while awaiting stool samples or clinical improvement. Only four prisoners were placed in isolation for periods in excess of one full day, the range being 3- 6 days.

 

Isolation

To prevent primary and secondary spread the advice of the OCT was that cases should be kept off work duties until 48 hours symptom free. This was managed in the prison setting by ensuring that all confirmed and probable cases were confined to their cells and assessed daily by prison nursing staff. This procedure went further than the OCT advice but ensured symptomatic cases did not attend work or have recreational time with other prisoners in their own hall.

 

Information

Posted notices informed staff and prisoners regarding infection control and good hygiene. 

Improved hygiene

Regarding communal toilet and handwashing facilities the OCT advised:

·        A ‘deep clean’ be carried out of all communal toilet areas, and then kept clean.

·        Use of liquid soap in wall mounted dispensers.

·        Paper towels be made available and disposed of in foot-operated, lidded bins.

·        In those areas assessed to be a ‘fire risk’ adequately maintained warm air dryers could be used.

·        Plugs be removed from the communal area washhand basins.

·        Passmen be issued with protective clothing for toilet cleaning duties.

 

Although environmental health inspection of kitchens gave little objective cause for concern a precautionary ‘deep clean’ of the kitchen was recommended.

 

Steps to improve food hygiene

In response to the concerns raised surrounding the storage of food within cells and a subsequent risk assessment exercise the following recommendations were made:

·        Refurbishment of one Hall servery as a pilot project with planned further upgrading of other servery areas subject to available resources.

·        Named staff to be given responsibility for monitoring cleanliness in each accommodation area.

·        Food safety advice to be displayed on notice boards, menus, and in every cell.

·        General hygiene advice to be incorporated in SPS video link service.

·        Facilities made available to encourage the dispose of waste food by prisoners.

 

National implications

The OCT made recommendations to the SPS in its entirety as well as formulating local recommendations to the Shotts prison.

 

Discussion And Lessons Learned

The reporting of gastrointestinal outbreaks in Scottish prisons is not a common occurrence. This was the first such incident reported to the Scottish Centre for Infection & Environmental Health (SCIEH)[i] since a robust surveillance system was introduced across Scotland in 1996. (John Cowden, Epidemiologist, SCIEH, personal communication, 25/9/02).

 In England and Wales the then Public Health Laboratory Service (PHLS)[ii] monitored gastrointestinal outbreaks in prisons, young offenders institutions and secure units. There had been 16 outbreaks between 1992 and 2001 and one outbreak in 2002. Salmonella enteriditis PT4 had been the causative organism in seven outbreaks. Numbers affected were between two and 200 (Surveillance Co-ordinator, Gastrointestinal Disease Division, PHLS, personal communication, 16/10/02).

[i] SCIEH is now Health Protection Scotland (HPS)

[ii] PHLS is now part of Health Protection Agency (HPA)

 

This outbreak was small in nature, but due to the unique community nature of the prison setting it was appropriate to activate a full investigative and control response at an early stage. Despite this the cause of the outbreak was not ascertained. 

In this setting NHS and environmental health staff were reliant on advice regarding the application and adaptation of control measures to the security environment and the sometimes adversarial, often mistrusting, culture of prison life. A clear example of this was that the OCT did not accept self-reporting of symptoms without a degree of healthcare ‘approval’.  The hoarding of cooked food by prisoners in cells is not in itself a contravention of prison rules and therefore influencing such practices was difficult. Yet it was considered that a high proportion of cells were a hygiene risk due to food storage.

The levels of toilet cleanliness, provision of toilet paper and appropriate hand-washing and hand-drying facilities particularly in work sheds was clearly inadequate. Parallels can be drawn with research findings from standards in school toilets where hygiene standards are found to be poor and the facilities poorly maintained. 1  The application of evidence based infection control practices such as the provision of single use paper towels for hand drying were practically difficult in this setting given perceived risks of fire hazards and blockage of basins and toilets.

Recognising the unusual nature of this outbreak and the learning which had taken place by all involved, the OCT made a number of local and national recommendations to the NHS Board and the Scottish Prison Service.

It was considered there was a need to increase the proactive interaction between SPS institutions and both Local Authority Health Protection Departments and NHS Board Public Health Departments in regard to food safety and infection control practices.

Despite recognised practical difficulties, the SPS was reminded that it must provide acceptable standards of hygiene particularly in relation to toilet and washing facilities.

The storage of cooked food in individual cells was felt to be potentially hazardous. The SPS was asked to assess its ‘duty of care’ in this regard and consider advice to inmates and ensure the easy and hygienic disposal of cooked food from cells. 

The OCT welcomed the SPS Infection Control Manual 2 but to improve staff and inmates safety asked that the SPS should ensure that due consideration be given to adequate resources.

 

POSTIVE OUTCOMES

This was a relatively small outbreak, but one which by combination of setting and timing has had significant positive benefits at national level. 

Recent national guidance recommended that NHS Boards be responsible for following up on the outcome of OCT recommendations 3  By doing precisely this and with good co-operation by Shotts Prison, environmental hygiene and food hygiene showed demonstrable improvement. For example, liquid soap and paper towels were made available in all communal toilet areas, the cleaning frequency within those areas was increased and passmen were issued with protective clothing.  The usual practice of serving food to other prisoners, by passmen with toilet cleaning duties, was ceased. All servery areas were upgraded and the prison established a monthly Infection Control Group. 

Of perhaps more significance, formal follow up on the OCT recommendations to the SPS was influential at a national level in assisting the SPS to progress the development of an infection control structure across the service, with a planned programme of work and regular reporting. This built upon the SPS infection control guidelines also published in late 2002.  A full time infection control adviser was promptly seconded to SPS headquarters, appropriate training started, and the first national SPS infection control committee was established within six months of the OCT report. This committee has successfully increased the profile of infection control across the SPS, with prison based infection control groups established in several prisons across Scotland. Indeed the SPS has now corporately embedded infection control as part of their civilising agenda. Members of the Lanarkshire HPT continue to provide NHS input to the national SPS infection control committee building on the links started during the outbreak.

 

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This publication acknowledges the full involvement of the members of the OCT.

 

 

REFERENCES

  1. Barnes PM, Maddocks A. Standards in school toilets – a questionnaire survey. J Public Health, 2002; 24:85-87

  2. SPS Control of Infection Guidelines, Sept 2002, Scottish Prison Service, Edinburgh

  3. Managing incidents presenting actual or potential risks to the public health. Guidance on the roles and responsibilities of incident control teams. 2003, Scottish Executive, Edinburgh

 


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